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Abstract 
Mobile games dominate the mobile app markets and contribute over half of the mobile 
app revenues. In order to attract more users and generate higher revenues, the 
platforms such as Apple iOS and Google Android, would like to partner with the game 
developers and have the developers exclusively stay at their own platforms to entice 
more consumer demands. For example, the game developer “Electronic Arts” agrees 
to offer Apple iOS a two-month exclusive window for the well-known mobile game 
“Plants vs. Zombies 2”. The benefits of the exclusivity to the platforms and app 
developers are unclear and not studies in the literature. This study aims (1) to provide 
managerial insights for the platforms and app developers, and (2) to analyze the pros 
and cons of the partnership strategy, e.g. when offering an exclusive deal, how do the 
platforms and developers maximize the corresponding profits by the exclusive deal, 
and what is the optimal exclusive duration? 
Keywords:  Mobile platform, exclusivity, two-sided market, network externalities 
 
Introduction 
The gaming market has become extremely huge and popular along with the development of the 
information technology. It still, obviously, has great potential for future growth, especially for mobile 
games. Evidences also show that the mobile games market is growing drastically. For example, App 
Annie (2015) reports that the game firms dominate its list of the top grossing app publishers for both 
iOS and Android platforms in 2014. The time spent with apps accounts for over half of time with digital 
media, and furthermore, 32% of time spent with apps is being spent on gaming (Shields, 2014). 
Apparently, people spend most of their time on gaming when using mobile phones. The market is 
expected to grow by additional 51% in North America, 47% in Western Europe, and 86% in China 
(Gaudiosi, 2015). According to Newzoo’s report, the global market size in 2014 further reaches $25 
billion, which is increased by 43% over the mobile game revenues in 2013 (Gaudiosi, 2015). 
For the mobile game industry, platforms such as Apple and Google attempt to gain exclusivity on titles 
for their own platforms so as to attract users to the platforms and sell more devices. For example, Apple 
approaches the top game developer “Electronic Arts” about making an exclusive deal. Electronic Arts 
ends up with agreeing to offer Apple two-month exclusivity windows for Plants VS Zombies 2 and then 
on Android after that (Newman,2014; Reisinger,2014). Apple can thus drive the demand for its platform 
during these two months. More examples can be found on both Google Android and Apple iOS. For 
example, Square Enix provides Google Android with one-month exclusive accesses for both Final 
Fantasy VI and Gree’s Rage of the Immortals (Newman, 2014). ZeptoLab’s Cut the Rope 2 have a three-
month head start on Apple’s platform (Newman, 2014). 
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For game developers, there is a tradeoff between offering an exclusive deal and staying multi-homing. 
If game developers chooses to make limited-time with a platform, they may lose the user demand from 
the other competing platforms during the period of exclusivity. On the other hand, multi-homing 
developers are required to spend extra costs such as porting and migration to make their games 
available to different platforms. Similarly, exclusivity is also a tradeoff for platforms. The tradeoffs drive 
us to pose this question: is gaining exclusivity on mobile games is profitable for platforms and 
developers? If yes, how long should developers take to keep the exclusivity on a single platform? And 
what is the optimal timing for developers move to the other platforms after the exclusivity? 
The purpose of the research is to build an analytical model to examine the exclusivity in the mobile 
game industry. We aim to provider managerial insights for game developers as well as platforms so that 
they are able to develop the business strategies. Our research goals include building an analytical model, 
finding the incentives and managerial insights. In our future research, we plan to collecte real industrial 
data and empirically verify our proposed model. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 lists the related work to our study. Section 3 outlines the stylized analytical models of 
exclusivity and investigates the profitability for platforms and game developers. Section 4 concludes the 
paper by summarizing the managerial insights of our analyses and providing some possible directions 
for future research. 
Related Work 
The mobile game market is a typical two-sided market. The concept of two-sided market is originated 
from the research on “two-sided matching markets”, which studies a function of market that match one 
type of agent with another. Gale & Shapley (1962) are of the earliest researchers who study the two-
sided matching model. They analyzed college admissions and marriage, and showed that there is always 
a stable matching status. Although they did not give the definition of two-sided market, the idea of this 
type of markets was first introduced into the economic area. Demange & Gale (1985) provided a model 
that describes two-sided matching market. In a matching market, agents are buyers and sellers (or firms 
and workers, or men and women) who form partnerships based on satisfaction and make pecuniary 
transactions. Examples of matching markets are housing market, academic markets and marriage 
markets. These markets still are the traditional tangible markets with both sides of transaction, which 
seem to have a unilateral market structure. However they actually have strict two-sided matching 
market form, although people focus on the platform less than the two sides of agents and 
consequentially the two-sided aspect of the transaction is less obvious. With the emergence of the 
housing agents, labor mediation and marriage intermediaries, the nature of these two-sided markets 
become clearer. Armstrong & Wright (2004; 2007), Armstrong (2006) and focus on competition 
between platforms. 
Our study is also highly related to the work of Cheng & Liu (2012). They explore the optimal trail time 
for time-locked version software. A framework is built to help make the binary decision between limited 
function version and time-locked version for software providers. Cheng & Liu (2012) prove the existence 
of the threshold of the variable for the binary decision and determine its value. 
The Model 
Adopting the works of Armstrong & Wright (2004) and Armstrong (2006), we consider one developer, 
providing a game to two competing platforms, A and G (as shown in Figure1). The developer chooses 
whether to offer an exclusive deal to platform A or not. If an exclusive deal is offered, the developer will 
not partner with platform G until the end of the exclusivity. Consumers join either Platform A, or 
Platform G. We assume that the developer and Platform A and G are rational and all seek the maximum 
profits, and that each consumer will not play the game until purchasing it. 
Following the model setup in Cheng & Liu (2012), let the duration of the exclusivity be denoted by . 
Without loss of generality, τ  is normalized between 0 and 1 by splitting the exclusive time by the 
expected life span of the game. The platforms receive payments from consumers, and both of the 
platforms charge consumers price  for access. The notation  represents the network size of the game, 
that is, the install base or the number of users that purchase the game given that the the length of the 
exclusivity time is τ. Each consumer’s valuation θ is increased by network externality γ, where  is 
the network effect intensity and captures the willingness to pay as an extra consumer takes part in the 
network. Table 1 provides a list of notations. 
 Availability of Exclusive Mobile Games 
  
 Twenty First Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Langkawi  2017  
 
Figure 1.  Market Structure 
 
Cheng & Liu (2012) also consider the functionality of the software. Of course, mobile games can be 
regarded as one type of software. However, for gamers, the functionality of the game should be utility 
and entertainment. We revise the model of Cheng & Liu (2012) a little bit by changing the software 
functionality s to the game utility μ, i.e., each consumer has prior belief μ about the utility of the game 
before purchasing. Basic speaking, consumers are initially inexperienced in a new game’s settings and 
control system. But they become more and more familiar and thus increase their utility after playing for 
periods of time. Let   capture the increment of the utility of the game per unit of time, and each 
consumer’s perceived utility about the game after playing for the exclusive time  is   . A consumer 
obtains the following net utility after purchasing the game: 
 U  θ  γ       (1) 
where c is the aggregate cost spent by consumers to play the game, including acquiring a mobile device, 
setting up the game deployment and soon. The first term θ  γ describes the network effect, while the 
second term     captures each consumer’s perceived utility about playing the game. We further 
discuss the two cases in the following section. 
Table 1. Summary of Notations 
p Price of the game 
τ Duration of the exclusive deal, τ ∈ 0,1 
 Network size of the game 
γ Network effect intensity 
 Consumer’s utility before purchasing 
 Increment of the utility of the game per unit of time 
 Consumer’s aggregate cost to play the game, e.g. effort cost 
 Developer’s cost when porting to another platform 
 Consumer type 
Table 1. Summary of Notations 
Case D: the Developer Leads the Exclusivity 
We first discuss the scenario where the developer leads the exclusivity. As shown in Figure 2, the 
developer offers an exclusive deal to Platform A. The exclusive deal is sustained for  units of time. We 
let   denote the marginal consumer type who is indifferent between the exclusive deal and non-
exclusive for the period 0, , and let  denote the same consumer type as the exclusive deal is not 
offered. The developer changes to release the game across two platforms after exclusive time . The 
developer is required to spend more porting and developing cost  for simultaneously staying at two 
platforms even though it is able to entice more demand from Platform A and G. Figure 2 also 
demonstrates total consumer demand as the shadow region, i.e.   1  τθ. The developer seeks to 
set one decision variables, the price of the game p, to maximize the profit as follows: 
 max

π$ 	 	p &   c' (2) 
 Availability of Exclusive Mobile Games 
  
 Twenty First Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Langkawi  2017  
subject to 
 0 (  ( 1 (3) 
 p ) 0 (4) 
Eq. (2) describes the developer’s profit function. Inequality (3) ensures the demand is nonnegative and 
no larger than the total number of consumers. Inequality (4) requires that the price p be nonnegative.  
Recall that  represents the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing the game or not. 
Setting the net utility function in Equation (1) to zero, we derive the marginal consumer type as  
*+
,*-   . Hence, the demand for the game is described by   1  τθ. Substituting  
*+
,*-   
into the demand function, we derive the demand of the game as   ,*-/*+0*1,*- . Then the above 
problem conducts the optimal price $∗  03 
4
  δ   and the optimal profit 6$
∗  07
4*8/+9
0/:4*8 . 
After examining the optimal profit, we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. For the whole life span of a game, the developer tends to release it across two platforms 
rather than offer an exclusive deal to only one platform.  
Proof. Please see the appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows that the developer’s optimal strategy. We find that the developer is able to obtain 
the optimal profit as she chooses not to join Platform A right in the beginning of releasing the game, i.e. 
τ  0. We further discuss the second scenario and Platform A’s best strategy in the next section. 
  
Figure 2.  Distribution of Potential Consumers in Case D 
Case A: Platform A Leads the Exclusivity 
We then discuss the scenario where Platform A leads the exclusivity. Because of high cost of devices, we 
note that most consumers may not purchase another device if they have already had one. It is very easy 
to observe the phenomenon in the mobile phone market. Hence, we assume that if consumers choose 
to join a platform in the beginning, they will keep staying at the same platform until the end of the life 
span. Figure 3 shows the consumer distribution for the case, i.e.   1  θ . The. The profit 
maximization problem is as follows: 
 max

π; 	 	p &    (5) 
subject to  
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 0 (  ( 1 (6) 
 p ) 0  (7) 
Eq. (5) describes the developer’s profit function in Case E. Inequality (6) ensures the demand is 
nonnegative and no larger than the total number of consumers. Inequality (7) requires that the price p 
be nonnegative. The above problem conducts the following optimal price ;∗  03 μ  δτ    and profit 
of game 6;∗  07
4*8/+9
0/:4*8. We obtain Proposition 2 after examining the optimal profit. 
Proposition 2. In order to obtain the maximum profit, Platform A’s best strategy is to keep the 
developer staying at its own platform.  
Proof. Please see the appendix.  
Proposition 2 shows that the developer’s optimal strategy. The profit of Platform A and the duration of 
the exclusive deal is positively related so that the profit for Platform A is maximized when the game is 
totally exclusively released to it, i.e. τ  1. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Distribution of Potential Consumers in Case A 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the research is to build an analytical model to examine the exclusivity in the mobile 
game industry. Our preliminary result shows that platforms prefer making an exclusive deal while 
developer prefers staying across different platforms. We find that platforms and developers have the 
totally different preferences for the duration of the exclusivity. However, a game can only begin to make 
profit after platforms and developers making an agreement in the duration of exclusive deal. We plan 
to further explore the interactions between platforms and developers in the game to make exclusive 
time decisions. For example, developers and platforms negotiate the optimal exclusive period of time.  
Extending previous analytical models into the two-sided mobile game market, we find that the two user 
groups have the completely opposite preferences when they pursue their own maximizing profits, where 
the platforms in the market prefer an exclusive deal while the developers in the prefer multi-homing 
deal. Accordingly, the agreement in the duration of exclusive deal is significant for both of the two user 
groups by knowing the other user group in this two-sided market having a completely opposite 
preference and rationally pursuing its own optimal decision. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
For the given duration of the exclusive deal (τ), when the duration of the exclusive deal τ approaches 0, 
the developer’s optimal profit tends to be infinity, where lim
→?
6$∗ ∞. We find that profit for developer 
is maximized when the duration of the exclusive deal tends to 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
For the given duration of the exclusive deal (τ), both price (p) and demand ( are monotonically 
increasing functions of the duration of the exclusive deal (τ), where ;∗  03 μ  δτ  	  and  
4*8//+
4*80/: 
4*8/+
34*80/: 
0
30/: A1 
+
4*8B.  We find that the exclusive game enable Platform A to the 
charge the highest price with the largest demand. That is, max

∗  03 μ  τ    and max 
∗ 
4*8/+
34*80/:, resulting in the maximized profit 6$
∗  07
4*8/+9
0/:4*8. 
